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Abstract: This paper is devoted to an examination of issues concerning the 
persistence and linguistic re-expression of indexical singular belief. I discuss two 
approaches to the topic: the directly referential approach, which I take as best 
represented in Kaplan's views, and the neo-Fregean approach, which I take as best 
represented in Gareth Evans's views. The upshot of my discussion is twofold. On 
the one hand, I argue that both Kaplan's account and Evans's account are on the 
whole defective. On the other, I claim that a broadly Fregean account is still to be 
preferred, since by positing semantically efficacious modes of presentation it is 
clearly better equipped to deal with the phenomena in the area. In particular, I 
argue that the notion of a memory-based mode of presentation of an object (a 
spatio-temporal particular, a region in space, a period of time, etc.), as introduced 
by Christopher Peacocke, turns out to be indispensable to account for the 
persistence and re-expression of intentional mental states over time. 
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SOBRE A PERSISTÊNCIA E RE-EXPRESSÃO DE 
CRENÇAS INDEXICAIS 
 
Resumo: Este artigo contém um exame crítico de questões relativas à persistência e 
re-expressão linguística de crenças singulares indexicais. Nele são discutidos dois 
pontos de vista centrais sobre o tópico: a concepção diretamente referencial, que é 
tomada como sendo melhor representada pelo tratamento proporcionado por 
David Kaplan; e a concepção neo-Fregeana, que é tomada como sendo melhor 
representada pelo tratamento proporcionado por Gareth Evans. O resultado da 
discussão tem duas faces. Por um lado, argumenta-se que quer o ponto de vista de 
Kaplan quer o ponto de vista de Evans são, em geral, incorretos. Por outro lado, 
sustenta-se que uma concepção genericamente Fregeana deve ainda ser preferida. 
De fato, ao postular modos de apresentação indexicais semanticamente eficazes, 
essa concepção está claramente melhor equipada para lidar satisfatoriamente com 
os fenômenos na área. Em particular, argumenta-se que a noção de um modo de 
apresentação singular baseado numa memória de um objeto (um particular 
espacio-temporal, uma região no espaço, um período de tempo, etc.), tal como a 
noção foi introduzida por Christopher Peacocke, se revela como sendo 
indispensável para explicar adequadamente a persistência e a re-expressão de 
estados mentais intencionais através do tempo. 
 
Palavras chave: Crença. Dinâmica cognitiva. Indexicais. Modos de apresentação. 
Sentido fregeano. Proposição singular.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
This paper is devoted to an examination of the topic of 
cognitive dynamics as introduced by David Kaplan in his essay 
‘Demonstratives’ and further exploited in the sequel 
‘Afterthoughts’.2  
I discuss two approaches to cognitive dynamics: the directly 
referential approach, which I take as best represented in Kaplan’s 
views, and the neo-Fregean approach, which I take as best 
represented in Gareth Evans’s views. The upshot of my discussion is 
 
2 Kaplan 1988a (especially 537-8) and 1988b.  
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twofold. On the one hand, I argue that both Kaplan’s account and 
Evans’s account are on the whole defective – even though there are 
features of each of those views which seem to be along the right lines. 
On the other hand, I claim that a broadly Fregean account is still to 
be preferred since by positing semantically efficacious modes of 
presentation it is clearly better equipped to deal with the phenomena 
in the area. In particular, I argue that the notion of a memory-based 
mode of presentation of an object3 (a spatio-temporal particular, a 
region in space, a period of time, etc.), turns out to be indispensable 
for the purpose of accounting for the persistence of intentional 
mental states over time.4  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 1 one of the 
outstanding problems in cognitive dynamics is introduced. In Section 
2 an immediate reaction to the problem, the Natural Realignment 
Claim, is formulated and two different readings of it are isolated for 
further consideration. In Section 3 one of those readings, the 
Sufficiency Claim, is considered and rejected. Section 4 contains an 
                                            
3 The relevant notion is introduced and expounded in Christopher 
Peacocke 1983, Chapter 6. 
4 Although the claim will not be argued here, I also believe that so-called 
“notational variance” claims made in connection with indexical reference 
and content should be regarded as unwarranted in the area of cognitive 
dynamics as well. There have been some such claims on the neo-Fregean 
side, claims to the effect that the most plausible directly referential account 
of indexical reference and content one could devise would be at bottom a 
notational variant of a Fregean theory, for it would be bound to employ 
some Fregean notion of indexical sense; and there have been some such 
claims on the neo-Millian side as well, claims to the effect that the most 
plausible neo-Fregean account of indexical reference and content one could 
devise would be at bottom a notational variant of a Millian theory, for the 
indexical senses posited by the account would turn out to be redundant or 
semantically inert. When considered in relation to issues about the 
persistence of mental states with content over time, I think such notational 
variance claims emerge even more clearly as definitely wrong. 
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examination of the remaining claim, the Necessity Claim, in 
connection with Kaplan’s and Evans’s views. Finally, in Section 5 
those views are both regarded as inadequate and an alternative 
account is sketched, the Necessity Claim being eventually rejected.  
 
1. THE PROBLEM  
Cognitive dynamics is the study of attitude-retention. It is 
concerned with the conditions under which propositional attitudes – 
e.g. beliefs, desires, and fears – can be said to persist over time, and 
the conditions under which ascriptions of the form ‘x continues to 
believe (fear, desire, etc.) that p at time t’, or of the form ‘x no longer 
believes (fears, desires, etc.) that p at t’, can be said to be true or false, 
correct or incorrect.  
I assume for the purposes at hand a familiar, though not fully 
uncontroversial, picture of propositional attitudes, the so-called 
relational view. On this view the attitudes are relational mental 
states, holding between given subjects, on the one hand, and thoughts 
or propositions, on the other; the latter are said to be the contents of 
the mental states and they are supposed to possess unrelativized 
truth-values.5 We shall be mostly concerned with attitudes that have 
singular thoughts, i.e. thoughts that are irreducibly about specific 
objects, as their contents.6
 
5 Thus, they are unlike sentences of a natural language in that their 
truth-values are not supposed to vary along with variations in certain 
evaluation parameters (e.g. time). 
6 I assume, of course, that there are indeed such thoughts, another 
assumption, which is not completely uncontroversial. In addition, I am 
aware that concerning some cases it is not beyond dispute whether a given 
proposition is a singular proposition in that sense; but we need not worry 
about the issue here.   
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Let me now introduce one of the most challenging issues in 
cognitive dynamics. The problem concerns mainly the phenomena 
of retention of those attitudes which have indexical propositions as 
their contents, propositions that might be expressed by utterances in 
given contexts of sentences containing at least one occurrence of an 
indexical referring expression. The kinds of indexical content whose 
investigation seems to be more interesting are: (1) temporal indexical 
thoughts, such as the thought that tomorrow museums are closed in 
Florence; (2) spatial indexical thoughts, such as the thought that here 
is hot; and (3) perception-dependent indexical thoughts, such as the 
thought that this dog is a German Sheppard.  
 Cases where one is dealing with indexical contents of those 
types are problematic because they often involve some realignment 
in the linguistic means of expression of a thought – on the part of a 
given thinker – as time goes by. In other words, there are situations 
in which the verbal expression of an indexical thought entertained by 
a thinker at a given time must, at a later time, be readjusted in a 
certain way by the thinker in order for the thought in question to be 
then entertained; so that one could presumably say that some 
propositional attitude held at the earlier time towards the thought in 
question has been retained by the thinker at the later time, the very 
same thought being the object of the attitude on both occasions. 
Naturally, such readjustments are to be thought of as being operated 
in the linguistic means employed for the expression of the thoughts. 
Indeed, it does not make much sense – at least in the light of the 
picture of content we are assuming – to think of the thoughts as 
being themselves subjected to any sort of change or realignment.7 As 
                                            
7 Note that this is only apparently inconsistent with the claim, currently 
endorsed by many philosophers, that indexical thoughts (or at least a vast 
majority of them) are irreducibly indexical in nature, in the sense of 
containing indexical ingredients which cannot be analysed away in terms of 
some allegedly “eternal” elements. 
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we shall see, the problem is that certain linguistic means which prima 
facie suggest themselves as appropriate to the effect do not seem to 
capture certain facts about the cognitive structure of given thinkers. 
Such difficulties typically arise from the fact that very often the 
objects thought about at the earlier times are no longer indexically 
accessible at the later times. 
 Here is a general formulation of the problem. Suppose that at 
a time t a subject x holds a belief b with content that p, where the 
proposition that p is a singular indexical proposition. Suppose that, 
at t, x sincerely and assertivey utters, or assents to, a token of a 
sentence-type S containing some indexical referring expression i and 
expressing, with respect to the context of use, the proposition that p. 
We are then invited to consider the following questions. Under what 
circumstances should we say that, at a later time t', x has retained her 
belief b? Notice that this question, taken as a question in philosophical 
semantics, is to be intended in the following sense.8 What sentence or 
sentences S' – presumably containing some indexical expression i' 
different from, but co-referential with, i – must x be disposed to 
assent to, or to assert, at t' so that we would be entitled to say that 
her belief b has been retained at t'? Obviously, a minimal 
requirement one should make here is that S' must have the same 
content as S, i.e. it must have the proposition that p as its content 
(relative to the context of use). Indeed, identity of mental content 
over time is clearly a necessary condition for attitude-retention. 
 
8 The question will be taken mainly in this sense throughout the paper. 
Of course, retention and re-expression are different things: the former does 
not entail the latter even with respect to fully articulate speakers of a 
human language. 
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 The following sort of simple situation will illustrate the 
problem.9 Suppose that, at a certain time t, I sincerely and assertively 
utter, or assent to, a token of the sentence-type 
 
(1) This room is hot now. 
One would then say that at t I hold a particular belief about the 
temperature in the room where I happen to be at t; the belief might 
be formed on that occasion, or it might already exist and just be 
linguistically manifested then. Now what sentence or sentences 
should I be prepared to accept10 at a later time t', say three minutes 
later, in order to retain (or re-express) the belief I formed or voiced at 
t? How should I readjust at t' the thought – relative to its verbal 
expression, of course – I entertained and believed at t? Well, assuming 
that at t' I am still in the same room, a natural candidate would be a 
token of the sentence 
(2) This room was hot three minutes ago; 
To take another case, consider the notorious ‘today’/‘yes-
terday’ example.11 Suppose that on a certain day, say d, Jones says 
(4) Today is fine, 
and believes it. What sentence or sentences should he be disposed to 
accept on the following day, d+1, so that one could say that he has 
                                            
9 I concentrate on cases involving temporal thoughts, but the remarks 
could surely be adapted to apply to other varieties of indexical content. 
10 Henceforth I use ‘accept’ to cover either cases of (sincere and 
reflective) assertion of a sentence or cases of (sincere and reflective) assent to 
a sentence. 
11 This example can be found as early as in Gottlob Frege’s 1918 essay 
‘Der Gedanke’ (Frege 1967). 
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then retained his previously manifested belief about the weather on d? 
Again, a plausible choice would apparently be given in the sentence 
(5) Yesterday was fine. 
Analogous questions might be naturally raised with respect to 
sentences containing other categories of indexical terms, such as 
spatial indexicals like ‘here’ and ‘there’ or perceptual demonstratives 
like ‘this pen’ and ‘that pen’. 
 
2. THE NATURAL REALIGNMENT CLAIM  
Let us call the above claim, the claim that sentences such as (2) 
and (5), taken with respect to the envisaged contexts of utterance, 
constitute choices which are appropriate for attitude-retention the 
Natural Realignment Claim. I take it that it is a prima facie intui-
tively sound claim.   
Now the Natural Realignment Claim might be given two 
different readings. Take Jones's case, for instance. On the one hand, 
it might be held that Jones might be said to have retained on d+1 the 
belief he held on d (by accepting then (4)) only if he would be 
disposed to accept (5) on d+1. That is to say, the claim is that a 
disposition to accept a token of the sentence in question on the later 
occasion is necessary for retention of the belief had on the earlier 
occasion.12 On the other hand, it might be held that Jones's 
disposition to accept (5) on d+1 is sufficient for retention of the belief 
he held on d (by accepting then (4)). I shall refer to those distinct 
 
12 Naturally, it is assumed – and I shall keep this assumption throughout 
our coming discussion – that Jones is an articulate speaker of English eager 
to give voice to his beliefs; otherwise such a claim would be manifestly 
false. 
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versions of the Natural Realignment Claim as the Necessity Claim 
and the Sufficiency Claim (respectively). 
 
3. THE SUFFICIENCY CLAIM  
It is instructive see why the Sufficiency Claim version does not 
hold, e.g. why Jones's propensity to accept (5) on d+1 is not – taken 
per se – sufficient for belief-retention. In what follows I mention two 
different ways by means of which such an insufficiency could be 
displayed. 
First, suppose that on d+1 – for instance as a result of a blow 
in the head – Jones forgets everything about the preceding day, 
especially what the weather was like then. Suppose further that on 
d+1 – being aware of Jones's condition – a reliable friend gives him 
some information about d, including the information that it was a 
fine day; and suppose that Jones accepts this testimony without any 
reluctance. Then one might surely conclude that on d+1 Jones 
would be disposed to accept (5). Yet, under such circumstances, one 
would hardly say that he would have thereby retained on d+1 the 
particular belief he held on d (by accepting then (4)). It seems that in 
order to secure belief-retention Jones's disposition to accept (5) on 
d+1 must be causally connected in some way or other with his 
acceptance of (4) on d. Indeed, one would have to say that he is 
disposed to accept (5) on d+1 because he accepted (4) on d; or that he 
believes today – i.e. d+1 – that yesterday – i.e. d – was fine because he 
believed yesterday that yesterday was fine. And in the above sort of 
situation, such a causal connection – which, as the case suggests, may 
involve memory – is clearly absent.  
Second, suppose that Jones accepts sentence (4) at 11:58 p.m. 
on d; and that three minutes later, being unaware that midnight has 
already passed, he comes to accept sentence (5). Of course, under 
such circumstances, with the word ‘yesterday’ Jones intends to refer 
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to d-1, a day on which – he remembers (let us suppose) – the weather 
was also fine.13 Therefore, Jones accepts (5) on d+1; even though he 
would reject such a description of his situation if he were confronted 
with it. However, it is obvious that one could not claim that he has 
thereby re-expressed the belief he held on d.14 Again, some kind of 
causal connection appears to be required for attitude-retention. And 
in those circumstances such a connection – which, as the case 
suggests, may involve the exercise of a tracking ability, the ability to 
keep track of a period of time as time passes – is missing. In effect, in 
the envisioned situation one would not say that Jones accepts (5) on 
d+1 in virtue of his previous acceptance of (4) on d (the reason being 
that meanwhile he has lost track of day d).  
Now one might be attracted by the idea that some sort of 
internal continuity is constitutive of attitude-retention, the required 
causal connection being regarded as resting upon such continuity. 
Here are two proposals for fleshing out this idea, both suggested by 
previous remarks and to which I shall return later.  
The first proposal brings out memory as one of the forms of 
interior continuity which are crucially present in attitude-retention. I 
take for granted that, in general, memory is not epistemically 
transparent to the subject. There clearly is a distinction between 
remembering and seeming to remember; for instance, it is possible to 
remember certain events while thinking that one does not 
remember them, or at least without thinking that one remembers 
them. So endorsing the claim that there is some sort of interior 
continuity involved in attitude-retention does not entail that the 
retained mental states be epistemically transparent to their subjects.  
 
13 One might also assume that he correctly remembers the weather on d 
(whatever it was like) 
14 At most, and even this is rather problematic, one could perhaps claim 
that Jones has thereby retained a certain belief held on d-1 about the 
weather on that day. 
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The second proposal brings out the already noticed tracking 
capacity. One might remark with respect to Jones’s case that he 
thinks that he is believing a different thing – when he accepts 
sentence (5) – in virtue of the fact that he thinks that he has correctly 
kept track of time, whereas in fact he has mistracked the days; wrong 
beliefs about content identity may thus be caused by wrong beliefs 
about tracking. Hence the continued exercise of an ability to keep 
track of an object, namely a day, as time flows may also provide us 
with a form of internal continuity of the kind needed for attitude-
retention.  
The notion of tracking an object has its clearest and primary 
application in the case of perception. Following Evans, one might 
maintain that an exercised ability to track a spatiotemporal particular 
over time and/or space should be in general taken as being 
constitutive of that variety of attitude-retention one might call P-
retention. Roughly, P-retention consists in a subject's re-expressing by 
means of perceptual demonstratives certain attitudes previously held 
towards perception-dependent thoughts, for instance certain previous 
perceptual beliefs (also expressed then with the help of perceptual 
demonstratives). I shall refer to this claim as principle (K) and give it 
the following formulation. Let the thought that q be a perception-
dependent thought about some spatiotemporal item v. Then the 
following holds: 
 
(K) Necessarily, if a subject x P-retains a belief b, with 
content that q, throughout an interval of time from t0 to 
tn, then x keeps track of v from t0 to tn. 
 
Thus, suppose that on seeing a certain woman at a party I say ‘She 
is French’ and believe it. The claim is then this. In order to be able 
to P-retain on a later occasion during the party the belief about the 
woman in question I previously voiced by uttering that sentence – 
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that is to say, in order to be able to re-express later that belief by 
means of a perceptual demonstrative, e.g. ‘That woman’ or ‘The 
woman over there’ or ‘You’ – I must somehow have kept track of 
the woman in question from one moment to the other (by means 
of some sensory modality, e.g. sight, or some combination of 
sensory modalities). 
The foregoing remarks seem to point to an extension of 
principle (K) to cases of attitude-retention in which given subjects are 
able to re-express by means of temporal indexicals, e.g. ‘yesterday’ 
and ‘a moment ago’, certain beliefs formerly held towards temporal 
indexical thoughts, for instance certain previous temporal beliefs 
involving ‘today’-thoughts or ‘now’-thoughts. Let us refer to such a 
variety of attitude-retention as T-retention. Then one might formulate 
as follows the envisaged temporal analogue of principle (K). Let the 
thought that r be a temporal indexical thought about a particular 
time u. Then the following holds: 
 
(K)* Necessarily, if a subject x T-retains a belief b, withcon-
tent that r, throughout an interval of time from t0 to tn, 
then x keeps track of u from t0 to tn. 
 
Thus, for example, in order for Jones to be able to T-retain on d+1 – 
or to re-express on d+1 by means of a temporal indexical – the belief 
he held on d about d (by accepting then (4)), he must keep track of d 
from d to d+1. And an analogue of principle (K) could also be 
formulated to cover cases of what one might call S-retention, cases in 
which a subject re-expresses by means of spatial indexicals, e.g. ‘over 
there’, certain beliefs and other attitudes formerly taken towards 
spatial indexical thoughts, e.g. certain previous spatial beliefs 
involving ‘here’-thoughts.  
The following general conclusion might be extracted from our 
reflection on the ‘today’/‘yesterday’ case; and parallel results would 
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surely hold for other pairs of temporal indexicals such as ‘now’/‘th-
ree minutes ago’, for pairs of spatial indexicals such as ‘here’/‘there’, 
and for pairs of perceptual demonstratives such as ‘this pen’/‘that 
pen’. Given an acceptance of sentence (4) on a day d, a subject's 
disposition to accept (5) on d+1 would not by itself guarantee the 
persistence of the belief held on d. The reason is that at least one of 
the following conditions might not be satisfied: (i)- the subject 
remembers the weather on d; (ii)- he keeps track of the days from d 
to d+1.  
 
4. THE NECESSITY CLAIM  
Is the Natural Realignment Claim – construed as the Necessity 
Claim – a sound claim? Recall that this is the claim that, given an 
acceptance of sentence (4) on d, a propensity to accept sentence (5) 
on d+1 would be necessary to retain then the belief held on d.  
To begin with, note that the Necessity Claim might be 
subscribed to by an advocate of a directly referential account of 
indexical content. Indeed, a direct reference theorist might come to 
endorse the idea that only by being disposed to accept a sentence 
such as (5) on d+1 would our subject be able to retain the ‘today’-
belief he held on d. For she might insist that, at least in the case of 
singular indexical belief, belief-retention should be regarded as 
being sensitive, not only to believed contents, but also to ways of 
believing contents (characters, in Kaplan’s terminology, or roles, 
in John Perry’s terminology).  
Thus, in order for Jones to re-express his ‘today’-belief on 
the following day it would not be enough for him to accept then 
the same content. This content would (roughly speaking) be the 
neo-Russellian proposition consisting of the day d itself and the 
property of being fine. Yet, Jones could believe such a proposition 
on d+1 under a variety of ways, including non-indexical ones such 
 JOÃO BRANQUINHO  
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as those involving date indicators like ‘July 3, 1997’ or ‘John’s 
birthday’. And it might be reasonably argued that not every way 
of believing a neo-Russellian proposition is appropriate to secure 
belief-retention. Accordingly, given that on d the proposition in 
question is believed by the subject under the character (of) ‘today’, 
the direct reference theorist might impose the following condition 
on belief-retention.15 She might demand that that character, i.e. the 
“old” singular character, be readjusted in such a way that: (1) the 
“new” singular character determines the same neo-Russellian 
content, viz. the same object; and (2) the new character is suitably 
related to the old character, in the sense of belonging to what 
might be loosely called the same range of singular characters or 
ways of believing. ‘today’, ‘yesterday’, ‘tomorrow’, ‘two days ago’, 
etc., would form a single range of singular characters in that sense, 
and ‘here’, ‘there’, ‘over there’, etc., would belong in another 
range. The Necessity Claim might then be naturally vindicated: 
only by entertaining on d+1 the ‘yesterday’-way of believing the 
above neo-Russellian proposition would Jones be able to retain his 
previous ‘today’-belief.  
The criticism might be levelled against such an account that 
it would fall short of providing us with any kind of interior 
continuity. On the one hand, neo-Russellian propositions are by 
definition something that is, in general, wholly external to their 
thinkers. On the other, it seems unlikely that the notion of a 
character, or a way of believing some content, might be adequately 
used to the effect. On d+1 Jones is required to accept the same 
content under a suitably related character (in the above sense). 
However, it is still unclear what relation should obtain between 
the old and the new character so that it could yield the interior 
 
15 Of course, the condition is intended to be generalizable to the other 
varieties of singular indexical belief. 
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continuity involved in attitude-retention.16 Hence, lacking the 
appropriate kind of conceptual apparatus, at least to the extent that 
the semantic level of explanation is concerned, the direct reference 
theorist seems to be left with the problem of accounting in some 
way or other for such continuity. Thus, she seems to be left with 
the general problem of accounting for attitude-retention.  
But this dismissal is too quick. One possible move available 
to the direct reference theorist would be to invoke at this point the 
already mentioned tracking capacity and take it as providing us 
with the sort of connection among characters which is involved in 
                                            
16 This is Kaplan's point in 1988a, footnote 64. However, Mark Richard, 
a direct reference theorist, makes an interesting suggestion along the 
following lines (see Richard 1990, p. 228). When Jones accepts (4) on d he 
might be seen as also accepting the sentence ‘A-certain-dayd is fine’, where 
‘a-certain-dayd’ is construed as being a non-indexical device by means of 
which Jones would be able to refer to d when this day becomes "indexically 
inaccessible". Thus, on d+1 he could either accept (5) or ‘A-certain-dayd is 
fine’. And this would apparently provide us with the sort of continuity 
needed for retention. Our subject employs either distinct tokens of the 
same name of the object thought about, viz. the day d, or a "chain" of 
tokens of distinct names of the object, where the connection between such 
tokens is secured by memory; one either has "memory traces" of earlier 
tokens or groups tokens with such traces. The problem is that on Richard's 
view the objects of belief (and other attitudes) are not, strictly speaking, 
neo-Russellian propositions since they include not only the objects and 
properties thought about but also certain expressions in the language of 
thought which represent them; thus, the object of Jones's belief on d would 
be something like the ordered pair <<‘is fine’,being fine>, <‘today’,d>>, 
or the pair  <<‘is fine’,being fine>,<‘a-certain-dayd’,d>>. And, given 
the kind of interior connection between names appealed to above, one 
might have reasons to suspect that such a view turns out to be rather 
similar to a broadly Fregean account of attitude-retention such as the one 
outlined below. Furthermore, Richard’s view does not provide belief-
retention because the object of belief is not constant and belief-retention 
should be taken, I think, as requiring identity of content believed. 
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belief-retention. The idea is that underlying a given range of 
indexical ways of believing of the envisaged types (temporal, 
spatial, perceptual) is the exercise of an ability to keep track of an 
object over space and/or time. This would give us the needed 
“internal” element, while being perfectly consistent with the 
coarse-grained contents posited by the account: structures of 
objects and properties or relations. Of course, one might at this 
point protest that, by introducing ways of believing which are far 
from being semantically inert, and notwithstanding the adoption 
of a purely referential notion of indexical content, the emerging 
theory would turn out to be more Fregean than Millian. But that is 
a different issue, irrelevant to our present concerns.17
On the other side of the dispute, the “interior continuity” issue 
would not represent a problem for neo-Fregean approaches to 
indexical content, especially the account advanced by Evans. The 
reason is that the considerations usually employed on such an 
account to establish the result that Jones's acceptance of (5) on d+1 
would, under normal circumstances, manifest the persistence of the 
particular content believed by him on d (when he accepts (4)), are 
such that they provide us at once with the desired interior 
continuity. In effect, on that brand of Fregeanism, it is claimed that 
the particular proposition Jones believes by accepting (4) on d is 
strictly identical to the one he believes by being disposed to accept (5) 
on d+1.  Because both propositions are composed out of the very 
same way of thinking of an object (a day); and such a way of thinking 
is taken to be a temporally extended mode of presentation of the day 
d, one which consists in a way of keeping track of d from d to d+1 
which Jones employs in thought.  
 
17 I think that if the mere admission of semantically efficacious modes of 
presentation or senses is taken as a defining feature of a Fregean theory 
(whether or not they are located at the level of propositional content), then 
the protest is sound.  
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Thus, a particular form of internal continuity, the one noticed 
before and given in the exercise of an ability to keep track of a period 
of time as it recedes into the past, is in this manner incorporated into 
indexical content itself. The neo-Fregean theorist would on that basis 
be able to reach the conclusion that a subject's disposition to accept 
(5) on d+1 is necessary for her to retain the content believed on d. 
For, on his view, if the subject keeps track of the day d from d to 
d+1 then she is bound to have such a disposition on d+1, and if she 
wants to retain then the content of her earlier belief, then she must 
exercise such an ability. An argument along the following lines could 
then be mounted with a view to establishing the Necessity Claim. If 
the above result holds, i.e. if a disposition to accept (5) on d+1 is 
necessary for preservation of content, then such a disposition is 
necessary for belief-retention; since, in general, belief-retention 
requires identity of content believed.  
To sum up, we could say that the Necessity Claim might be 
accepted both by a neo-Fregean theorist and by a direct reference 
theorist in so far as they might both endorse the following line of 
reasoning (though on different grounds):  
 
Premise 1: Tracking an object over time and/or space is 
necessary for retaining on later occasions singular indexical 
beliefs expressed on earlier occasions by means of sentences of 
certain kinds (‘today’-sentences, ‘here’-sentences, etc.).  
Premise 2: A disposition to accept sentences of certain kinds 
(‘yesterday’-sentences, ‘there’-sentences, etc.) on the later 
occasions is necessarily involved in tracking.  
Conclusion: Therefore, such a disposition is necessary for 
belief-retention.  
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Now the strongest objection I know to the Necessity Claim 
comes from the “direct reference” side: Kaplan's criticism in 
‘Demonstratives’. Kaplan dismisses as unsatisfactory such an answer 
to the problem of cognitive dynamics; and, as far as I can see, he does 
not provide us with any alternative solution to the problem, leaving 
it open. His argument might be represented as the following sort of 
reductio. If, in order to be able to retain on d+1 his former belief, 
Jones must replace ‘today’ with ‘yesterday’ and accept (5), then if he 
were someone like Rip van Winkle – someone who systematically 
looses track of time and never knows his own position in time – it 
would be utterly impossible for him to retain that belief; for the 
simple reason that he could never be in a position to accept, or to be 
disposed to accept, a sentence such as (5) (in a sincere and reflective 
manner, of course). Naturally, Kaplan takes this as a rather 
implausible consequence of the claim under discussion. Thus, what 
Kaplan seems to reject is some such idea as the idea that in order to 
retain demonstrative or indexical beliefs about a given object for a 
period of time a subject must keep track of the object in question 
throughout that period of time; in other words, Kaplan seems to 
reject some such principles about retention as (K) and (K)*, and in 
general Premise 1 of the above argument for the Necessity Claim. 
The strongest rejoinder I know to Kaplan's argument is 
Evans's in his essay ‘Understanding Demonstratives’.18 Evans rejects 
Kaplan's verdict and takes the above sort of consequence as being 
perfectly acceptable. He argues that an ability to keep track of time – 
which, as we have seen, manifests itself in a propensity to accept (5) 
on d+1 given an acceptance of (4) on d – necessarily underlies Jones's 
retention of his original belief. If Jones were like Rip van Winkle and 
that ability were missing, there would be no belief-retention. If the 
subject has not tracked the object, she has lost it (cognitively 
 
18 Evans 1981; see especially footnote 21 on page 311. 
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speaking); and if she has lost the object, she has thereby lost her 
former singular belief about it. Rather, the subject would be under 
the illusion of having retained a certain belief.19
How should one assess such a dispute? First, notice that the 
case presented by Kaplan is an extreme one. I am inclined to think 
that Evans is probably right when he holds that a subject who 
systematically and massively mistracks time – e.g. by sleeping for too 
many consecutive days – could hardly be in a position to retain 
temporal beliefs; at least, he could hardly retain temporal beliefs 
involving ‘today’-thoughts, ‘now’-thoughts, ‘this year’-thoughts, and 
the like. Maybe the right thing to say about someone like Rip van 
Winkle is that such a person would be unable to form any such 
temporal beliefs in the first place – and hence to retain them, of 
course. But this is not entirely right either, since it is not fully 
implausible that Rip might be capable of forming ‘now’-beliefs.  
Anyway, there is no need for such an extreme case for an 
analogous point could be made with respect to cases in which we deal 
with subjects who only temporarily lose track of time. Thus, let us 
go back to Jones’s story. Suppose that he accepts (4) at 11:58 p.m. on 
d and that, three minutes later, he is unsure whether midnight has 
passed; suppose further that he has no means to check the time. 
Hence, Jones would not be in a position to be disposed to accept (5) 
at 00:01 a.m. on d+1, such a disposition being grounded on an ability 
to keep track of a day which he happens not to be able to exercise in 
the situation described. Therefore, according to the Necessity Claim, 
it seems that Jones would be prevented from retaining at 00:01 a.m. 
on d+1 the belief he held at 11:58 p.m. on d. Yet, there is a clear 
sense in which at 00:01 a.m. on d+1 Jones still continues to believe 
what he believed three minutes earlier. There is a strong intuition to 
the effect that it should be possible for Jones to retain then the belief 
                                            
19 Hence, Evans takes attitude-retention to be epistemically opaque, 
which on my view is entirely correct. 
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held on the day before about the weather on that day; even if he is ex 
hypothesi not able to think of the day in question as yesterday, or as 
the day which immediately precedes today, or to identify it by 
means of knowledge of his own position in time.20  
 
5. MEMORY AND BELIEF-RETENTION  
The approach I am willing to endorse, and whose main ideas 
are subsequently sketched, is one which is both in partial agreement 
with Evans's views and in partial agreement with Kaplan's views.  
Pace Evans, I believe that the Necessity Claim is not in general 
sound. As pointed out, I would agree with Kaplan's verdict that in 
the above sort of circumstance – in spite of not being disposed to 
accept (5) on d+1, and hence in spite of not being in a position to 
keep track of d in a certain canonical way, viz. as the preceding day 
– Jones might still be seen as having retained his earlier belief. What 
sort of retention would that be, and how might Jones manifest it, are 
questions I take up below.  
On the other hand, I believe that principles such as (K) and 
(K)* still impose plausible constraints upon a subject's ability to 
retain in a certain way attitudes with indexical contents. Thus, pace 
Kaplan, I think that the notion of keeping track of an object over 
time and/or space – in the perceptual case, the notion of following or 
monitoring a public item as it moves around, we move around, and 
time passes – should still be seen as playing an important role in an 
adequate account of attitude-retention. Our rejection of the Necessity 
Claim should not be regarded as being inconsistent with our 
acceptance of such principles as (K) or (K)*. Indeed, there is more 
than a kernel of truth in Evans's doctrine that in order to retain in a 
 
20 John Perry shares this intuition and argues in the same vein (but on 
different grounds) even with respect to Rip van Winkle’s situation (see 
Perry 1997); I have doubts concerning the extreme case, though. 
ON THE PERSISTENCE AND RE-EXPRESSION OF INDEXICAL BELIEF 
 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil., Campinas, v. 31, n. 2, p. 00-00, jul.-dez. 2008. 
21 
certain manner a previous indexical belief a subject must keep track 
of the object thought about. However, I have strong reservations 
concerning his doctrine that ways of tracking objects – for instance, 
the one underlying an appropriate succession of beliefs involving 
‘today’, ‘tomorrow’, and ‘yesterday’ – are themselves to be taken as 
modes of presentation and thus as component parts of indexical 
contents.21  
As remarked before, I think it is perfectly possible for a subject 
to retain, and also to re-express, on d+1 a belief held on d (by 
accepting (4)) without having then any disposition to accept (5). One 
might represent the basic mistake made by a proponent of the 
Necessity Claim as consisting in a tacit endorsement of some 
strengthened forms of principles such as (K) and (K)*. According to 
the stronger principles in question, a subject's exercise of an ability to 
track a given object over time and/or space would be required for the 
subject to retain tout court perceptual or temporal beliefs previously 
held about the object in question. Whereas, according to the formula-
tions proposed and which I take as plausible, the weaker principles 
(K) and (K)* are restricted respectively to cases of P-retention, i.e. re-
expression of former perceptual beliefs by means of perceptual de-
monstratives, and to cases of T-retention, i.e. re-expression of former 
temporal beliefs by means of temporal indexicals.22 Using a different 
terminology, one could say that those principles operate by limiting 
retention and re-expression to ways of believing available within a 
given range of ways of believing.  
So the Necessity Claim might be viewed as resting upon an 
assimilation of attitude-retention in general to T-retention, in the 
                                            
21 I thus agree with Stephen Schiffer’s criticism of Evans’s views in his 
forthcomimg paper Schiffer 2005. 
22 A similarly restricted principle would hold for spatial beliefs. 
 JOÃO BRANQUINHO  
 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil., Campinas, v. 31, n. 2, p. 00-00, jul.-dez. 2008. 
22 
                                           
temporal case, and to P-retention, in the perceptual case.23 But such a 
conflation is a mistake since not every instance of retention tout court 
is to be taken, for example, as an instance of T-retention (even when 
the objects of retention are temporal beliefs).24 Thus, if Jones 
mistracked time in the way described before, then – in the light of 
principle (K)* – what he would not be in a position to do at 00:01 
a.m. on  d+1 is to T-retain the particular belief he held at 11:58 p.m. 
on d+1 when he accepted (4). In other words, he would not be able 
to re-express then such a belief by using a temporal indexical such as 
‘yesterday’. Nevertheless, it does not follow that it would be 
impossible for him to retain, or even re-express, tout court that 
particular belief. 
It seems to me that retention should be possible in such cases 
and the account we have developed so far already provides us with 
the sort of result we need to make sense of such a possibility. Indeed, 
it is almost a truism that there is an intimate connection between 
attitude-retention and memory. One could handle cases such as 
Jones’s as follows. Supposing that on d+1 he remembers what the 
weather was like on d, one might say that he would be then in a 
position to retain the belief had on d, such a retention being secured 
by memory. Accordingly, what one should take as being the extreme 
case here is not the case of a massive loss of a capacity to keep track 
of time (Rip van Winkle's situation), but rather that of a massive loss 
of memory, i.e. the case of amnesia. Hence, what one ought to say is 
that temporal beliefs such as the ones we have been discussing could 
hardly be retained by an amnesiac (mutatis mutandis for perceptual 
and spatial beliefs of the intended kinds).  
 
23 Hence, the flaw in the general argument for the Necessity Claim 
should also be located in Premise 1, but on different grounds than those 
Kaplan seems to have in mind.  
24 Obviously, the converse claim is false. 
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If this is right then it is reasonable to assert the following. 
Although Jones is ex hypothesi unable on d+1 to keep track of d, i.e. 
to think of d as yesterday, he still might be said to have retained on 
d+1 his former belief about d in a certain way, namely by means of 
memory, and not in virtue of the particular position he occupies in 
time or of his knowledge of such a position. I conclude then that one 
should regard as unacceptable the claim that a disposition to accept 
(5) on d+1 is necessary for a thinker to retain or re-express then a 
belief she had on d by accepting (4). The presence of such a disposi-
tion is therefore not necessary for belief-retention (and it is not suffi-
cient either). 
Assuming thus that what I have called the Natural Realign-
ment does not constitute a necessary condition for belief-retention, 
one is still left with the problem of specifying what sort of linguistic 
readjustment (if any) could Jones make on d+1 with a view to 
expressing then the persistence of the particular belief he had on d. A 
tentative proposal, suggested by some of the preceding observations, 
might be sketched in the following way. When Jones accepts (4) on 
d, he might as well have accepted a token of a sentence such as 
 
 (6) This day is fine; 
 
where the demonstrative phrase ‘this day’ is associated in the context 
with a perceptual demonstrative mode of presentation of the day 
thought about, viz. d. Indeed, it seems plausible to regard ‘today’ – 
taken in its pronominal use – as having a genuinely demonstrative 
sense, so that an utterance of (4) on a certain day might be seen as 
expressing the very same thought as an utterance of (6) on the same 
day. Now if such a suggestion is plausible, then a way by means of 
which a thinker like Jones could re-express on d+1 the belief held on 
d (by accepting (4) then) would be to accept, or to have a disposition 
to accept, on d+1 a token of a sentence such as 
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 (7) That day was fine. 
 
The demonstrative phrase ‘that day’ would be here taken as 
expressing in the context a memory-based demonstrative mode of 
presentation of d, i.e. a way of thinking of a certain day anchored 
upon a memory demonstration of the day in question. Reference to a 
particular day would be in this way secured by memory; and one 
might still say that the thinker knows which day is in question, or 
that he is in a certain sense acquainted with the object thought about, 
since he thinks of that day as the day on which certain remembered 
events took place.  
The idea is that belief-retention would be secured by means of 
the following sort of realignment of mode of presentation: the 
primitive perceptual demonstrative mode, the one associated with 
‘this day’ (or ‘today’), would be readjusted into a memory-based 
demonstrative mode, the one associated with ‘that day’, the same 
object (day) being presented by both modes.  
If one were a strict Fregean and regarded modes of 
presentation as being locatable at the level of semantic or mental 
content, then one would have to argue to the effect that such a 
readjustment of mode of presentation does not constitute a literal 
change and does not create a new mode of presentation. Accordingly, 
from that point of view there would be a single temporally extended 
demonstrative mode and a hence a single Fregean thought would be 
expressed both by (6) and (7) (taken in the intended contexts). But 
that is far from being a compulsory move. Moreover, I think it is 
extremely difficult to make sense of the claim that a single mode of 
presentation is involved in such cases, for there just seem to be two 
distinct ways of thinking about an object; and that claim is absolutely 
needed to guarantee identity of content.  
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So perhaps one should replace strict Fregeanism with a view 
on which modes of presentation, in spite of being external to mental 
content, are nevertheless semantically efficacious. Roughly speaking, 
modes of presentation, or ways of believing contents, are 
semantically efficacious in the sense that ascriptions of attitude-
retention, in particular the correctness and incorrectness of such 
ascriptions, or their truth-values, are sensitive not only to the sheer 
existence of modes but to their identity and nature. On such a 
moderately Fregean view, it would be rather natural to take semantic 
or mental content as being purely referential or coarse-grained, in the 
neo-Russellian sense of complexes of objects and properties or 
relations. The above kind of readjustment of mode of presentation 
might then be regarded as constituting a literal change, in the sense 
that two demonstrative modes would be involved there: the “old” 
perceptual mode and the “new” memory-based mode. Yet, on the 
view in question one would still have a single, purely referential, 
thought; and strict identity of content could be accounted for in a 
presumably less troublesome way. Thus, belief-retention would be 
secured, not at the level of content as on the strictly Fregean view, 
but at the level of semantically efficacious modes of presentation: 
only certain modes, modes endowed with certain features and related 
in a certain way, would be appropriate to the effect.25  
An analysis of attributions of attitude-retention might be then 
sketched along the following lines. Let p be a sentence used in 
context c and containing some indexical singular term i referring to 
some object o with respect to c. We want to account for sentences of 
the form 
 
                                            
25 See the discussion at page 15. 
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 x As that p at time t and x continues to A that p at time t’, 
or 
x As that p from time t to time t’, 
 
where the schematic letter A is to be replaced by any attitude verb. 
Here is the proposed account 
 
x As that p from t to t’ if and only if ∃m ∃<p> (m presents 
o and m´ presents o and x A* <p> under m at t and ∀ti 
t<ti≤t’ ∃m’ (x A* <p> under m’ at ti and R mm’)) 
 
m and m’ are singular indexical modes of presentation, <p> is the 
neo-Russellian proposition expressed by sentence p in context c, A* 
is the relation denoted by attitude verb A, and R is an appropriate 
relation holding between singular modes of presentation. 
The relation R should connect modes m and m’ in such a way 
that x’s attitude towards proposition <p> at ti be caused by x’s 
attitude towards <p> at t. On my view, there are two central sorts 
of relation between modes that are able to ensure such a causal 
connection: the link through memory and the link through the 
exercise of the tracking ability. Illustrating, m might be the today-
mode of presentation of day d and m’ the yesterday-mode of 
presentation of d; or m might be the today-mode of presentation of d 
and m’ the memory based mode of presentation of d. 
I finish by briefly dealing with an interesting objection put 
forward by Jason Stanley in discussion. Stanley argues, in defence of 
Evans’s view, as follows. The moderate case mounted before, Jones’s 
case, does not refute the Necessity Claim after all, since the subject 
Jones surely has the propensity to accept sentence (5) on d+1. For 
although this propensity is not manifested in the first few minutes of 
day d+1, nothing prevents it from being regularly manifestible 
throughout that day. Stanley concludes that Kaplan’s more radical 
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scenario is actually needed to reject the necessity claim, which is not 
good news. 
However, I don’t find Stanley’s move convincing. One might 
easily change the scenario so that it succeeds in refuting the Necessity 
Claim without being radical. Suppose Jones comes to accept (4) on d 
and then, during the night of d, say at 10 p.m., he is kidnapped and 
locked in a dark room, where he is kept for the entire day d+1 in 
complete isolation. Jones has no watch, no fax machine, no mobile 
phone, etc. He is lost in time for all the day d+1, having thus no 
propensity at all, at any time throughout that day, to come to accept 
sentence (5). Yet, I think there is a sense in which he could still retain 
and re-express at any such time the belief held on day d by accepting 
then sentence (4). 
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